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Abstract 
 
A small scale test of the integrity of Internet Web 2.0 social network sites was undertaken 
over several weeks in 2007. The fictional identities of four female underage children where 
posted on three network sites and later introduced to relay chat forums in order to explore the 
impact of apparent vulnerability on potential selection of Internet victims. Only one of the 
three social network sites in the study recognised that the postings violated child protection 
policies and subsequently closed down the underage postings.  
 
Two basic identities were created: one that engendered a needy and vulnerable 
characterisation of a child while the other identity was created to represent a happy and 
attached child character. The number of contacts and suspicious contacts were monitored to 
test assumptions about child ‘vulnerability’ and risks of unwanted sexual solicitations. The 
characters created also included either an avatar and/or contact details. These variants of the 
experiment showed that the inclusion of an image or access details increased the likelihood of 
contacts, including suspicious contact regardless of ‘vulnerability’. This small experiment 
noted that although vulnerable children with additional cues maybe at more risk all children 
who posted details about themselves on social network sites faced the risk of contact by 
predators. The need for further research and better means of regulating such sites was 
suggested. 
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Introduction 
 
The online exploitation of children is no longer a novelty or a risk that can be addressed by 
expose alone.  The form of exploitation is also not confined to sexual abuse although these 
have attracted the most alarm. Various forms of commercial exploitation will also become so 
ubiquitous that measures such as the Australian government’s $189 million NetAlert (Salek 
2007) National Filtering Scheme for libraries and households and other screening or 
monitoring will be essential even though they may offer less protection than hoped (Minow 
2004). Although child pornography is now universally outlawed it may be still be viewed by 
thousands via the Internet (Grabosky 2007: 6) and will continue to generate demand for 
young victims. This paper provides an initial exploration of the role Web 2.0 network 
technology may play in providing access to underage victims who may be vulnerable to on-
line sexual predators. 
Fears about the potential risks of the Internet, especially for children have been long held, 
however, the advent and rapid uptake of websites such as MySpace have added to these fears 
(Pascu et. al. 2007). A growing understanding that the Internet is lawless is now widely 
acknowledged. “Without a seamless web of mutual legal assistance and comity between 
nations, and without public/private partnerships, policing the information superhighway will 
be impossible and the ‘frontier’ of cyberspace will be as lawless as any wild west.” 
(Broadhurst, 2006: 11). MySpace.com, for example, found from among the approximately 
180 million profiles on their popular social networking website more than 29,000 registered 
US sex offenders who also had profiles on the site (Sydney Morning Herald, July 25, 2007). 
This presumably excludes those who may have sought to hide their real identities. In these 
circumstances how can we minimise the risks for children and what governments, schools, 
parents and the Internet industry can do about increasing safety on the internet 
superhighway?  
Many studies have been undertaken from the criminological, psychological and sociological 
perspective on child abuse and paedophilia. Freud opened the way with his initial theory of 
childhood sexual abuse and the more controversial concept of repressed memories created as 
a result of that abuse. Much work has been done since to psychologically profile paedophiles, 
to categorise their behaviour, as well as to characterise both victims and predators (see 
Goldstein 1999). The focus has recently been about identifying risk factors and media-
induced, especially Internet moral panics about stranger-danger. Also recent research 
addressing the controversy about the role of Web search engines and logs has found that sex 
and pornography as a major topic for search engine users has declined from about 16.8 
percent of Web inquiries in 1997 to less than 4 percent by 2004 (Spinks, Partridge and Jensen 
2006). The willingness of males to visit such sites may also be exaggerated. Spinks et. al. 
2006 also cites Bogaert (2001) who reports a number of studies exploring what sort of 
sexually explicitly material men (undergraduates) choose to see. When given the opportunity 
half did not want to see any sexually explicit material while only 4 percent chose violent 
pornography and 3 percent child sexual activity. 
In many ways, however, the implications of the Internet for child sexual abuse, both in a real-
world context and an online context, are yet to be comprehensively and systematically 
studied.  The increasing commercialisation and privatisation of the Internet also pose 
complex regulatory questions as earlier versions of the ‘free’ Internet are colonised by 
identity and information miners of all stripes (Sarikakis, 2004). Studies so far have tended to 
concentrate on identifying various technologies and Internet areas that paedophiles utilise. 
Though now dated, the Forde and Patterson (1998) – Paedophile Internet Activity – by the 
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Australian Institute of Criminology, is a good example. It identified and explored dimensions 
of online child sexual abuse and exploitation from a technical, law-enforcement viewpoint. It 
examined paedophile activity online (using websites, newsgroups1, Internet Relay Chatrooms 
and so forth) to document and analyse ways in which paedophiles use these services to target 
victims, to publish child pornography and to network with each other. While this research 
was thorough, Forde and Patterson (1998:1) nevertheless acknowledge that: ‘There is a need 
for reliable information and competent investigation because a sophisticated level of 
technological competency was demonstrated by many paedophiles.’ 
 
Existing research concentrates on the extent and nature of online paedophilia and child abuse, 
focusing overwhelmingly on the use of certain Internet technologies. An example is Bilstad’s 
(1996) study, Obscenity and Indecency on the Usenet: The Legal And Political Future of 
Alt.Sex.Stories, which explores the use of newsgroup/bulletin board technologies as a way of 
publishing obscene material. It also includes written forms of child pornography. Similarly, 
Stanley’s (2002) study, Child Abuse and the Internet, covers the psychological profiles of at-
risk victim groups and paedophiles as well as exploring the methods and technologies used in 
the solicitation of children. Both studies are useful.  guides about the nature of the problem, 
but  fail to provide  direct evidence of how these bahaviours manifest and offer no tests 
(experiments) on theories involving grooming work with ‘at risk’ children..  
Mitchel, Finkelhor and Wolak’s (2001) study, Risk Factors for and Impact of Online Sexual 
Solicitation of Youth, goes a long way towards bridging this gap. The work is based on a 
telephone survey of 1501 youths aged between 10-17 and explores the ‘demographic and 
behavioural characteristics associated with solicitation risk and distress due to solicitation’. 
Through logistic regression, the study found that: 
 
Nineteen percent of youth who used the Internet regularly were the targets of unwanted 
sexual solicitation in the last year. Girls, older teens, troubled youth, frequent Internet users, 
chat room participants, and those who communicated online with strangers were at greater 
risk (Mitchel, et. al. 2001:3011). 
 
The higher risk for ‘troubled’ youth than ‘non-troubled’ youth has been a focal point for 
various studies of online child abuse. Troubled youth are defined by Mitchel et. al. 
(2001:3012) as: 
 
… a composite variable that includes items from a negative life events scale (death in the 
family, moving to a new home, parents divorced or separated, and/or a parent losing a job); 
from the physical and sexual assault items on a victimization scale; and a depression scale 
(≥5 depression symptoms in the past month).  
 
It is important to note that the authors go on to point out that these risk factors should not be 
overstated, as 75% of those who were sexually solicited online were not classed as ‘troubled’.  
But one of the inherent flaws in this type of research is that the respondents may not respond 
truthfully; within this subject-matter especially, and since parental consent has to be given for 
an interview to proceed, children may not admit to having been solicited online due to the 
sensitivity of the subject. They may also fear that their Internet privileges will be withheld if 
their parents are alarmed. 
                                                 
1 Newsgroups are discussion groups that utilise Usenet, a worldwide, non-centralised group of services that 
stores messages and files and forwards their content to other servers on demand. Alt.Sex.Stories is one of many 
discussion groups within Usenet. Newsgroups are accessed through Newsgroup Readers software, which is 
designed to use access Usenet (see M. Feather, 1999). 
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Nevertheless, a real risk of victim selection via the routine scanning of social network sites 
and chat rooms does exist and dissemination about victims also can occur via private bulletin 
boards involving password control. These technologies of anonymity enable one to create a 
false identity and it is possible for participants in such bulletin boards never to have met face 
to face, and not to know each other (Grant et. al. 1997, Grabosky 2007). For example, a 
recent case involved three men who had never met in person and knew each other only 
online. All three were convicted in a London Court of a conspiracy to rape a girl under 16, 
based on a discussion in an internet chat room (Choo & Smith 2007:4). 
 
Such closed networks are also ideal vectors for both dissemination and sale of child-related 
sexual exploitation. For example, Operation Cathedral was one of the first major international 
investigation of child pornography that targeted the Wonderland Club, a network operating in 
at least 14 nations in Europe to North America to Australia and involving over 100 offenders. 
The Club periodically rotated servers in order to avoid detection, and access to the system 
was password-protected. The commercialization of child pornography has also led to the 
involvement of credit card payment processing companies to manage the revenue generated.  
In 2004, a major investigation called Operation Falcon led to indictments against two 
companies as well as a number of individuals (Ashcroft 2004 cited in Grabosky 2007). 
 
The Research Problem 
 
The answer to the difficulties of obtaining useful data about potential risks on the Internet can 
be partly overcome by applying a similar model to the one used by Demetriou and Silke 
(2003) in their study, A Criminological Internet Sting: Experimental Evidence of Illegal and 
Deviant Visits to a Website Trap.  This experiment utilized a purpose-built website, with real 
legal and fake illegal/pornographic content, to record and track which areas visitors accessed 
in order to ‘determine whether people who visited for the purpose of gaining access to legal 
material would also attempt to access illegal and/or pornographic material.’ They found about 
7% (58) of the 803 persons who had visited the site over an 88 day period attempted to access 
illegal pornography (although no actual materials were provided). The ‘sting’ is similar to the 
activities of law-enforcement officers in detecting and apprehending paedophiles online. 
 
The necessity of such methods has been upheld by the Australian High Court. The court 
found in 2002 that the effective investigation of certain crimes such as drug importation 
needed to show ‘… subterfuge, deceit and the intentional creation of opportunity to commit 
an offence.’ (Ridgeway v R, 2002 cited in Dixon 2002). This decision was reflected in 
Queensland law when the Criminal Code was amended to include using electronic means to 
solicit a child under 16 or expose a child under 16 to pornographic material. 
 
Approaching the problem from another direction is the investigative journalism of The New 
York Times’ Kurt Eichenwald (2005) in, Through His Webcam, a Boy Joins a Sordid Online 
World. Here, the reporter makes contact with a former under-aged amateur ‘porn-star’, an 18-
year-old man who started doing live strip-shows through his webcam at the age of 13. He 
then progressed to more and more obscene material until he ended up recording sessions with 
prostitutes. The reporter engages in an explorative study with the subject, helping him move 
away from his lifestyle while documenting the process by which he was first solicited for 
sexual content by online paedophiles and drawn into the world of webcam child pornography.  
Eichenwald’s investigation is one of the most compelling into online solicitation, child sexual 
grooming and exploitation. The methods used by paedophiles and victims and the 
characteristics of both are explored in a direct way. 
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This sort of explorative and scientific research into the use of the Internet by paedophiles is 
where future research may show promise, perhaps in close cooperation with law-enforcement 
agencies carrying out sting operations online.  Monitoring past Internet activity of 
paedophiles – as with the Forde-Patterson study – is not enough. Researching crimes as they 
are committed, from initial contact, through to solicitation and sexual grooming, then to the 
manipulation of the victim leading to a potential real-world meeting is vital. Only this will 
help us to identify and understand the methods, thought-processes and characteristics of 
victims that make them particularly attractive to paedophiles. 
 
Future research needs to be practical and aimed at law enforcement and crime-prevention, 
especially now that the world is beginning to look beyond issues of jurisdiction and national 
boundaries in fighting online child abuse. With the growing Web 2.0 phenomenon and the 
corresponding growth of social networking platforms (O’Reilly 2005; Appendix A), it is vital 
that sting-oriented experimental research be utilised to discover the risk factors and 
dangerous behavioural patterns that lead to online solicitation. The study presented in this 
paper explores the online environment by conducting such research and assessing the 
feasibility of such an approach. 
 
A simple sting experiment has been used, which sets up four profiles of 12-year-old girls on 
various social networking platforms. We test three variables: vulnerability, and two other 
related variables: the effect of avatars, or personal photos, and the presence of a direct 
method of contact, in this case an email address. These profiles were advertised on various 
IRC (Internet Relay Chat2), chat-rooms which young girls would likely frequent. 
 
The aim of this research was threefold: (a) to explore the feasibility and dimensions of 
research utilising a criminological sting design; (b) to gain knowledge of the dynamics and 
security of social networking platforms present at the current stage of the Web 2.0 
phenomenon and (c) to gain an understanding of which personal characteristics tested are 
more likely to be attractive to paedophiles. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that the scope is intentionally limited to 
explorative pilot research and raises the ethical issue of deception in the design and the 
unavoidable absence of consent by the ‘participants’ who contacted our fictional children.  
On balance we argue that we have not harmed or exposed to unnecessary risk any person and 
indeed mimic what is now common practice among police tasked with monitoring the 
internet for such activities.. Also the names of the social networking platforms involved have 
been fictionalised and the email addresses and other details of respondents removed to ensure 
anonymity. 
 
Methodology 
 
Four fictional identities or profiles were set up on three social networking platforms, 
Adulescentia.com (Adulescentia), Osirus.com (Osirus) and Horizon.com (Horizon). The 
objective was to discover how best to conduct a direct, experimental sting. The secondary 
objectives, though necessarily constrained due to the nature of this pilot study, were to 
discover which sets of variables are most attractive to paedophiles and whether the security of 
social networking platforms make it easier or harder for underage users to set up profiles and 
for paedophiles to find and solicit them. These fictional profiles are described in table 1 and 
were named as follows: Alicia (profile 1), Michaela (profile 2), Kate (profile 3) and Kelsey 
                                                 
2 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is a protocol using TCP communications between computers and servers, 
facilitating chat-rooms (called channels), which are used for group communication (see Feather, 1999). 
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(profile 4). The control group in this experiment are Michaela and Kelsey, created without an 
avatar or photo and without an openly displayed email address.  These profiles represent 
underage users, both vulnerable and non-vulnerable, who do not have the two risk-factors 
being tested for. 
 
Variables applied to the profiles 
 
The profiles chosen display the three main variables for the research as noted: vulnerability 
(referred to in the Mitchel, et. al, 2001 study as the characteristic of being ‘troubled’), the 
presence or lack of an avatar or photo and the ease of direct contact, measured by the 
presence or lack of an openly displayed email address. Table 1a summarises the variables and 
how they are used in each profile.  Table 1b and c describe the profiles as displayed on the 
Internet sites. The constants in all four profiles are the age (12 years), location and sex (all 
females for the purposes of this pilot study). Although paedophiles target boys as well as girls 
the majority of child sexual abuse is perpetrated by adult males against underage females (see 
Finkelhor, 1994). Further research should use both male and female profiles as variation 
based on the gender of target is likely. All cases were stated to be located in Brisbane, 
Australia. Each of the profiles was given different personal content to reduce the risk that 
they may have been detected as fakes. Instead, they were kept broadly true to the variables 
and constants, while the situation of each profile was different.  A small focus group of 
female undergraduate and high-school student assisted in developing “authentic” profiles. 
 
Vulnerability included factors such as the relationship with immediate family, a quiet 
disposition, lack of friends, self-esteem issues, a reliance on an Internet-oriented lifestyle, and 
an identification with the ‘Emo’, ‘Goth’ and other ‘alternative’ sub-cultures that are 
stereotypically regarded as having depressive or anti-social tendencies (in this case, through 
the act of listening to music associated with these sub-cultures). 
 
Profiles on social networking platforms such as Adulescentia and Osirus allow for a user to 
select an image, which is one associated with the profile’s public presentation. This image 
could be a photograph of the user, which is common in social networking platforms, or an 
avatar, which is more common in forums3 and other such websites. An avatar can be a 
picture, graphic or other image, which represents the person using it. The effect of a profile 
including a graphical avatar to draw attention, as opposed to one without, would be of interest 
to law-enforcement stings especially, as well as Internet users of the at-risk category. Two 
avatars were created from an online ‘doll-maker’ program, which allows the user to 
customise a human figure with clothes and other items. The figures created represented the 
personalities of the two profiles involved.  These avatars were used initially and then replaced 
with photographs digitally manipulated to disguise their true identity. 
 
The set-up of social networking platforms such as Adulescentia, Osirus and Horizon allows 
for communication by members via a private-messaging system, which is akin to an email 
service exclusively used between the members of the website. Members are generally 
discouraged from revealing their actual email addresses on their profile. Some do however, 
thus providing easier access to inexperienced Internet-users, especially children who may 
consider it exciting to be emailed. Openly displayed email addresses may create a more 
attractive target for solicitation. 
                                                 
3 Forums are discussion groups that use IP-based communication and present a graphical interface for messages 
and discussions to be read. Information is usually stored in a single location, within a database. Forums can be 
accessed through a browser’s normal HTTP protocol and is presented as a website, albeit one with dynamic 
content. 
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Table 1a.  Summary of variables in each fictional identity 
 
Profile 1: Alicia Profile 2: Michaela Profile 3: Kate Profile 4: Kelsey 
Vulnerable Vulnerable Not Vulnerable Not Vulnerable 
Avatar/Photo No Avatar/Photo Avatar/Photo No Avatar/Photo 
Contact (email) No Contact (email) Contact (email) No Contact (email) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Fictional profiles of vulnerable child 
Profile 1:  Alicia Picture: Avatar/Photo Email: star.struck_95@hotmail.com Female age 12 
Headline: Quiet and plotting. 
About Me: Well not much to know really ... I’m actually 12 years old (hush, I just wanted a public profile), I’m 
kinda quiet, I like reading, writing and listening to music. I’m also addicted to the Sims. I live with my mum, who 
thinks I should be just like her (perfect) and my older sis (kill me now, please), but I try not to pay too much 
attention to them. I spend most of my time on the net, and probably the rest of my time at school, which sucks most 
of the time … star.struck_95@hotmail.com 
I’d Like to Meet: People who’d actually listen to what I say instead of what’s in their heads. 
Interests: Reading and writing bad fanfics, listening to music, avoiding mum and sis 
Music: Guy Sebastian, Good Charlotte, Powderfinger ... all kinds of stuff. 
Films: Loved Spiderman but shh, I wasn’t suppose to see it. 
Television: Don’t get to watch much, mum and sis watch boring crap. I prefer the net. 
Books: Harry Potter (yum yum), Diary of Anne Frank (saddest book ever) 
Heroes: Spiderman … wish I could get an upside down kiss. 
Profile 2: Michaela Picture: None Email: None Female age 12 
Headline: Lonely girl on a lonely planet 
About Me: I’m really 12 years old (shh), I’m a bit of a loner, I like books and music and watching cool movies, 
I’m fairly quiet and I don’t make friends easily (who needs ‘em, right?).  I’m an only child who lives with my 
parents who I don’t get on with much, I live on the world wide interweb and I like chatting and annoying people. 
I’d Like to Meet: New people to chat to. 
Interests: Listening to awesome music, brooding, reading and writing.  And chatting. 
Music: I have a lot of music but mostly like Wolfmother, Avril Lavigne and Coldplay. 
Films: Too many to count.   
Television: I like House (yummy!) and Supernatural (two yummies?). 
Books: So many books and not enough time. Currently reading The Queen of the Damned by Anne Rice. 
Heroes: House! :p 
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Table 1b Fictional profiles of non-vulnerable child 
Profile 3: Kate Picture: to be supplied Email: Powered_by_cheese@hotmail.com Female age 12 
Headline: Look at me, I’m awesome, cool and sooo modest! 
About Me: Hey all :) I’m really 12 (whisper whisper), female, and decidedly awesome (of course!). I’m part of a 
wonderful and large family (one older brother, one younger sister, two parents (not three, and four is right out), one 
really cool grandmother and two Doberman Pinschers) and I like going places and doing things. Apparently to an 
annoying extent. I like abseiling, netball, skiing (in Australia, which is mostly desert … typical, huh?) and 
swimming. I also like chatting to new and interesting and weird people! … powered_by_cheese@hotmail.com 
I’d Like to Meet: Outgoing, awesome strange beings of the Internets. 
Interests: Repeating myself :p  abseiling, swimming, skiing, netball, going on runs with two huge doggies, family 
get-togethers (seriously awesome fun when I have such a huuuuuuge family!) and hanging out with friends. 
Music: I like all kinds of music, from classical stuff to R&B 
Films: Latest one I watched and liked was ‘Lady in the Water’. So touching! 
Television: Not too into TV, and I think Big Brother is silly. I don’t mind admitting that I watch Home and Away 
with my family during dinner, kind of a tradition here, but its too soapy sometimes. 
Books: I do like reading, but never seem to have enough time to finish books! 
Heroes: My mum and dad and grandmother (yeah, I know, I’m a sap) and I guess my friends! 
Profile 4: Kelsey Picture None Email: None Female aged 12 
Headline: Average girl seeks tin can. Will open for food. 
About Me: Let’s see … I’m only 12 years old (my profile is such a liar), an only child, I’m into drama (as in 
acting, not melodrama!) and music (I play the saxamaphooone) and I’m pretty much your basic high-flying girl … 
yeah sure :p I live with my mother who’s annoying but really awesome and our dog Wuff (called that because 
when you ask “what’s your name?” he makes a “Wuff!” sound!). I also like doing art and plan to go on being me 
for the rest of my life!  Challenging, hey? 
I’d Like to Meet: Other cool and creative people. 
Interests: Music, learning how to play the piano as well as the sax, drama, reading, filling out silly profiles on 
here. 
Music: Evanescence, Bach, John Coltrane 
Films: Hot Fuzz. Too awesome. 
Television: I’m a big fan of Doctor Who (David Tennant is hot!!), and it’s so unfair that the Brits get it first! I also 
like Lost and Big Brother. 
Books: Currently reading The Good Soldiers. 
Heroes: My dog Wuff! 
 
 
Social networking platforms – three examples 
 
Three different social networking services were chosen to place the fictional profiles. They 
varied in terms of their scale and community orientation. As noted in this research we give 
them the nom de plumes: Adulescentia, Osirus and Horizon. Adulescentia had two layers of 
membership: one for the 14-18 year-olds and one for the 18+ age group. The 14-18 age group 
membership did not have publicly viewable profiles. Instead, the user had to allow a request 
from another member to be part of his or her ‘friends list’ for access to the full profile, or be a 
part of that age group membership. There was a member search function on Adulescentia 
similar to that contained in personal websites. This enabled a user to search by sex, age, 
relationship or marital status, and also to seek out what a member was searching for on 
Adulescentia (dating, relationships, networking or friendships), plus a host of other 
descriptive factors such as height and physical build. The 14-18 year-olds had access to 
search for members from the age of 16-68, while the 18+ age group could only search for 
those over the age of 18-68. 
 
In order to test the integrity of the security that protects underage users on Adulescentia, 
Michaela and Kelsey were placed in the 14-18 age group. Both profiles stated that the user 
was actually 12-years-old from the outset. Alicia and Kate were placed in the 18+ age group 
and also stated openly that the user was actually 12-years-old. 
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The Osirus platform was originally designed for use by university students for networking 
purposes. It has been expanded, however, to include other interest groups and regional groups 
while retaining a focus on educational establishments. Profiles only become available to the 
groups that the user chooses to partake in: the general Australian regional group was selected 
which exposed the four profiles to around 52,000 members. Thus the Osirus platform, due to 
the non-public nature of their profiles, was an ideal control for the experiment. The same 
profile information, including the specified ‘real’ ages of the users, was supplied. 
 
Horizon is a Canadian-based social networking platform with a worldwide membership and 
is unique in that it has no layered memberships and has completely public profiles. The 
lowest age permitted is 14, which is also Canada’s age of consent (with certain exceptions).  
Horizon is much more community-oriented and is designed with an ethos similar to Internet 
forums and moderated chat-rooms than only online websites and profiles. This is reflected in 
its strong administrator and moderator presence. It has over 1,000,000 members, with around 
300,000 of them active. A large number of its users are below the age of 18 and as such, the 
service is targeted more at a younger membership. 
 
Responses of social network sites 
 
Within the experiment and the structure of these social networking platforms, three broad 
responses types are available. The first is the ‘friends list’ feature, where members can send a 
request to be added to another member’s list of friends. In Adulescentia’s 14-18 age group, an 
acceptance of such a request gives access to the member’s complete profile. It is similar to 
the contact list available in email software and instant messenger software4, and as such 
provides a means of tracking and bookmarking the profiles of people of interest to a member. 
 
The second response type is the private message, which is similar to an email that can only be 
accessed through the social networking platform and is limited to members. Private messages 
can be sent without members having accepted any ‘friends’ request, with the exception of the 
14-18 age group in Adulescentia, where only those within a friends list can exchange 
messages. The third response type is a direct email using addresses supplied with Alicia and 
Kate’s profiles. 
 
Suspicious responses within these three types are defined as those from accounts that are not 
spam   (advertising for musical groups or musicians, products or services) and are from 
members above the age of 18. The primary indicator of a suspicious response was sexual 
content in the first instance, or after a reply. Once sexual content is established, all contact 
with the responder ceased. The limited scope of this study, of course, excludes the possibility 
of an experienced paedophile initiating a long-term sexual grooming process or establishing 
one by posing as another child. Research about such responses would necessitate more in-
depth and correspondingly long-term studies. 
 
Results 
 
Our findings are reported over the three stages of the experiment – each stage leading to more 
adventurous exposure of the profiles.  In the first stage profiles were initially set up on 
Adulescentia and Osirus and left untouched for 14 days in order to ascertain the 
‘unencouraged lure’ of young girls. Within this period, no photographs were used for Alicia 
and Kate. Instead, two avatars were created using an online ‘doll’ maker. A doll is a cartoon 
                                                 
4 Instant Messenger programs are software than can be used to communicate with people who are also signed up 
to use the same software and are added onto a private friends list (Gross, Juvonen and Gable 2002).. 
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representation of a person and the software allows the user to change the doll’s clothing, hair 
and expression. To match their characteristics, Alicia was given paler skin, a blank 
expression and darker clothes as well as a set of black wings, while Kate received tanned 
skin, a happier expression and trendier clothes in bright colours. There were no results for 
this initial experiment from the Osirus platform at all, though there were limited results from 
Adulescentia, as can be seen in Table 2, 
 
Table 2 Responses to profiles at 14 days 
 
 Alicia Michaela Kate Kelsey 
Total Friends Requests 13 0 24 0 
Legitimate Requests 1 0 4 0 
Spam Requests 12 0 20 0 
Total Private Messages 2 0 3 0 
Legitimate Private Messages 1 0 2 0 
Spam Messages 1 0 1 0 
Direct Emails 0 NA 0 NA 
 
There were no responses for Michaela and Kelsey, which were the profiles without avatars. In 
fact, an examination of the count of individual visits to these profiles, listed in the profile 
page, showed no visits by any other member of Adulescentia at this stage, even by other 
members within the 14-18 age group. In searching for other members within Adulescentia, 
users could choose whether or not to search for members without avatars and most did not. In 
fact, the default option was to search only for members with avatars. 
 
The next stage of the experiment involved answering all legitimate responses from 
Adulescentia (Table 2), to discern which were innocent or suspicious. Alicia’s single 
legitimate ‘friends request’ proved to be innocent, with the member deleting Alicia off her 
friends list after realising her ‘true’ age. Her single legitimate private message, however, was 
suspicious. After establishing contact, the conversation rapidly turned sexual, with the 
member asking about masturbation and boyfriends. Three of Kate’s four legitimate friends 
requests were innocent, with one proving to be a member randomly adding profiles and the 
other two not fully reading her profile and her true age. One, however, looked suspicious 
after three replies, asking for personal details about intimate clothing and requesting personal 
photographs, despite having again been reminded of Kate’s age. Similarly, both of Kate’s 
legitimate private messages were suspicious, with the members becoming sexual soon after 
the reply. This process of answering legitimate responses was carried on throughout the 
remainder of the experiment. 
 
The modest response to the first stage of the experiment was indicative of the presence of 
paedophiles willing to track and solicit young girls. The experiment, however, required the 
presence of these girls on the Internet to be known, or put another way, to be ‘advertised’. In 
a normal situation, these girls would have been heavily active in forums, chat-rooms, other 
networking platforms, instant-messenger programs and so on.  These would all feature links 
back to the profiles. The experiment had to advertise the profiles in order to achieve this 
degree of realism. The third stage thus involved three expansions of the experiment: (a) the 
addition of profiles to another social networking platform, Horizon; (b) the use of 
photographs as opposed to graphical avatars and (c) the participation in Internet Relay Chat 
chat-rooms for advertising purposes. It must be noted that expanded research should utilise 
more than chat-rooms for advertising. A complete online presence must be maintained for 
each girl, including the activities listed above. For this explorative study, however, it is 
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sufficient that such advertising be tested to gain an understanding of the effect on the number 
of suspicious responses. 
 
Horizon provides human security in the form of moderators who accept or reject each profile 
as they are created. For this reason, Alicia’s and Kate’s profiles were created one day before 
Michaela and Kelsey’s, and their ‘true’ ages were omitted until after they had been accepted. 
When all were accepted into the system, Alicia’s and Kate’s profiles were updated with 
childhood photographs5. The childhood photographs were in turn slightly digitally 
manipulated to ensure the safety of the women who had provided them and to make them 
appear to be photographs taken from a digital camera.  After the photographs were uploaded, 
all four profiles were changed to reflect their ‘true’ ages.  Although receiving plenty of 
attention (mostly spam messages and requests), within three days all four profiles were 
suspended by Horizon staff. Although it is impossible to ascertain, this was probably done via 
the option for members to report any illegal profiles to the moderators. 
 
Expanding on this, the photographs replaced the avatars on Alicia’s and Kate’s profiles 
within the Adulescentia and Osirus platforms. Both platforms were used in the advertising, 
with one week’s advertising for each. The Undernet network of Internet Relay Chat (IRC), 
arguably the largest, was chosen for the advertising because of the un-moderated nature of 
the medium and the presence of tens of thousands of users at any given time. An IRC client 
called mIRC software6 was used to access the Undernet network7 as it was the mainstream 
software for IRC. The two chat-rooms chosen from Undernet’s list were #Teens and 
#Teenchat. Other directly sexual chat-rooms for all age groups were available but were 
rejected for the purposes of this study because the solicitations should occur within an 
‘innocent’ medium.  Due to practical considerations involved in advertising two sets of four 
profiles within a short exposure period of two weeks, it was decided to sacrifice a realistic 
schedule (particularly due to the international nature of IRC) and to partition each day into 
four slots, advertising each of the four profiles six hours apart and rotating them each day into 
different time slots as shown in table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 Timetable for Adulescentia and Osirus Profiles Advertised in IRC 
 
 12:00 
AM 
6:00 AM 12:00 PM 6:00 PM 
Monday Alicia Michaela Kate Kelsey 
Tuesday Kelsey Alicia Michaela Kate 
Wednesday Kate Kelsey Alicia Michaela 
Thursday Michaela Kate Kelsey Alicia 
Friday Alicia Michaela Kate Kelsey 
Saturday Kelsey Alicia Michaela Kate 
Sunday Kate Kelsey Alicia Michaela 
 
Profiles were advertised both in the main chat-room and in private chat to any person who 
initiated a conversation. An example of an advertisement in the main chat-room would be, 
“Hi I’m Alicia, 12/f/Australia, bored n’ lonely, anyone wanna talk or whatever add me on 
Adulescentia!”, followed by the appropriate URL. If there was conversation going on in the 
                                                 
5 Provided with the informed consent of the two adult women associates who agreed to be involved in the 
experiment.. 
6  See T. Vonck, Introduction to mIRC, accessed on April 3, 2007 at http://www.mirc.com/mirc.html 
7 S. Okeefe, C. Ovidiu, J. Angliss and B.B. Adnane, Introduction to Undernet, accessed on May 27, 2007, at 
http://www.undernet.org/ 
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chat-room, the characters would participate with the appropriate knowledge of Internet 
abbreviations and speech patterns. The roles of Kate and Kelsey, being the non-vulnerable 
profiles, were appropriately more spirited and socially aware in discussions, whilst Alicia and 
Michaela were shy and withdrawn. It is interesting to note that Kate and Kelsey received 
more attention from real or supposed younger people, whilst Alicia and Michaela attracted 
attention from those who didn’t identify directly as young and were more dominant in 
conversation. 
 
There were also many requests for photographs, with Alicia and Kate responding with links 
to their profiles, while Michaela and Kelsey denied having access to digital cameras. While 
there was plenty of suspicious attention directed at the girls within the chat-room, it was 
beyond the scope of this study to explore these interactions, though it is an area that needs 
further research. This is especially so as IRC is particularly involved with content crimes 
such as the trading of child pornography (Forde and Paterson 1998; Hellard 2001). 
 
The results of this final stage in the experiment were mixed. The Osirus profiles attracted 
some attention but mostly from other young members, actual or posing, some of whom 
became sexual as well. Alicia and Kate received all of the responses, with Alicia receiving 3 
‘friends’ requests, one of which turned sexual after 3 replies, and Kate receiving 5 friends 
requests, with 3 becoming sexual after a few replies. It must be noted that the chat-rooms, 
while primarily intended for what #Teens specified as ‘clean chat’, were also used by these 
younger people to initiate sexual discussion with the opposite sex. This has been argued by 
some sources, for example social worker Patrick O’Leary (cited in Munro, 2006: 23) to be a 
part of normal sexual exploration. Of course, as Taylor (2002) points out, these younger 
people could be victims of child abuse who copy the abuse they’ve suffered and inflict it on 
other children, being the result of learned behaviour (see White and Haines 2004: 60-62). The 
results of the Adulescentia profiles were more pronounced and are reported in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Stage 3 Results for Adulescentia 
 
 Alicia Michaela Kate Kelsey 
Total Friends Requests 16 6 13 3 
Suspicious Requests 7 1  5  0 
Spam Requests 0 0 0 0 
Total Private Messages 9 4 11 3 
Suspicious Private 
Messages 4 2  5  1 
Spam Messages 0 0 0 0 
Direct Emails 3 
 
NA 2 NA 
 
 
Discussion and analysis 
 
The main objective of this explorative study was to discern how best to conduct direct 
criminological research through experimentation, utilising a sting-oriented approach. Stage 1 
showed that even a passive approach netted results. The results gained, however, are relevant 
only for a specific category of paedophile that actively sorts through profiles. But such results 
are still surprising in a number of ways. The objective of the experiment was to find which 
profile (and which set of variable characteristics, the major one being vulnerability) attracted 
the most suspicious contacts. Or put another way, which profile was the most attractive to 
online paedophiles? The research of Mitchel et. al. (2001), reiterated the common belief, 
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reflected in official government literature that one of the most at-risk groups are ‘troubled’ 
children (NetAlert, 2005, Stanley 2002). By Stage 2, the profile with the most suspicious 
contacts was Kate’s, which was non-vulnerable with an avatar and a contact email, which is 
similar to the finding of Mitchel et. al. (2001) that 75% of those contacted were not troubled. 
These results, however, were limited due to the lack of advertising in the other sites of 
interest – chat-rooms. 
 
By Stage 3, these results had evened out further. Alicia and Kate received the most attention 
and, ignoring direct emails, received 44% and 42% of suspicious responses respectively out 
of the total they attracted. While a lengthier study may yield more results which may show a 
more significant percentage increase for one or the other, the presence of public profiles and 
photographs seems to indicate that vulnerability may not be the key issue as has been 
previously thought. It must be noted though, that a vulnerable child would be psychologically 
easier to control and manipulate than a non-vulnerable child. More interestingly, the 
difference between Michaela and Kelsey was more pronounced, with the more outgoing 
Kelsey receiving 17% suspicious responses of her total, as opposed to Michaela’s 30%. 
 
It may be misleading to focus on the view that vulnerable children are more likely to be 
targeted than non-vulnerable children – comforting perhaps to think that non-vulnerable 
children are at low risk. Thus paedophiles who have the patience, intelligence and 
understanding of the psychology (or pathology) of children may succeed by undertaking  the 
complex child sexual grooming process so succinctly summed up in NetAlert’s Paedophiles 
and Sexual Grooming article (NetAlert 2005: 2). Nevertheless, even outgoing and family-
oriented children such as Kate and Kelsey were at possible risk. It is important, therefore, to 
avoid perceiving paedophiles, especially those encountered online, as the type of sex offender 
who selects and only strikes a vulnerable target – a woman walking alone, drugged or drunk 
for example – then disappears. It is equally important to bear in mind that children are 
essentially vulnerable, in the sense that they are naïve and inexperienced, eager to please an 
adult and to make new friends. 
 
The results for Michaela and Kelsey seem to indicate that without the presence of public 
profiles and photographs, the results tend to support Mitchel, et. al. (2001) concerns about 
‘troubled’ or vulnerable children on the Internet. The presence of an email address does not 
seem to affect the risks to the extent anticipated, with Alicia receiving a 5% increase and 
Kate, a 4% increase. This seems to indicate that ease of access and a photograph spur on 
paedophiles, either from a rational weighing up of the ease of action and knowledge of the 
victim or because the presence of a photograph sparks off an attraction that overrides security 
and safety concerns. This would be closer to a psychologically positivistic explanation of 
paedophilia outlined by White and Haines (2004). The use of photographs in Stage 3 was 
revealing from the outset. One of the initial private messages received by Alicia via 
Adulescentia, for example, seems to support the positivism perspective: ‘Nice pic good angle 
on your face. You are very cute and I would like to chat with you. Australia is one of my 
favourite places, have not visited yet. Hope to chat with you soon.’8 
 
While the avatars made a difference, the photographs for Alicia and Kate seemed to tip the 
scales of interest, as seen in the results from the Osirus platform in particular, with Michaela 
and Kelsey not receiving any responses at all. From a security standpoint, the best solution 
seems to be to design social networking sites around forum communities rather than as an 
abstract service governed by rigid staff-member hierarchies. Horizon has by far provided the 
best security, with profiles being suspended as soon as the ‘true’ ages of the fictional girls 
                                                 
8 Private message, June 12, 2007. 
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were revealed. This seems to have resulted from the integration of users as staff: the platform 
is further moderated by the users themselves. Thus, the more intense the sense of community 
the more likely they will intervene as responsible members of that community. The relatively 
small size of Horizon as compared to Adulescentia and Osirus too, is probably a major factor. 
Horizon though, is sufficiently large for a purely ‘elitist’ staff to be unable to handle all the 
services alone. 
 
Had there been no media attention on child abuse within social networking platforms such as 
Adulescentia and Horizon (Mah 2007; Rawthorne 2007)  during the time of our research and 
had Adulescentia, in particular, not upgraded the security and structure of its service as a 
result, it is not inconceivable that there would have been even more suspicious responses than 
observed. The Adulescentia upgrades resulted in a safer environment for the 14-18 age group. 
It is difficult, however, for any social networking platform to take into account the de-
individuation theory which Demetriou and Silke (2003) explore in their study. In the world of 
the Internet, responsibility is low. It is tempting for underage users to have an 18+ profile 
because it is publicly viewable and has certain advantages that being in the 14-18 age group 
does not. It is also tempting for paedophiles to create accounts under the guise of young 
children to gain the trust of their chosen victims (O’Connel, Price and Barrow 2007) or to 
view the Internet as a safe and anonymous environment in which to freely interact with 
children. Further, it is tempting for both predator and prey to feel completely safe within at 
homes while allowing the world to visit via their computers. 
 
Conclusion  
 
An effective way to conduct direct research on online child sexual solicitation and the 
activities of Internet paedophiles is by establishing several complete Internet identities. 
Focusing on one medium alone – for example chat-rooms, without social networking 
platforms or forums – leaves an incomplete picture of underage users’ Internet activities. 
Social networking platforms can provide a major arena for paedophile activities and when 
expanded with advertising, constitute an almost unexplored domain for study. Although our 
study provided limited exposure and advertising it did demonstrate that such techniques can 
yield useful data. 
 
With the cooperation of social networking platforms, this study has shown that action 
oriented research could be undertaken by utilising as many different profiles and 
characteristics in order to discover how Internet paedophiles operate and what factors – such 
as avatars, photographs, publicly accessible profiles, email addresses and personality 
characteristics – affect their behaviour. In this case, the initial experimental design proved too 
passive and short-lived to be a method for attracting enough responses from Internet 
paedophiles. 
 
In our small pilot study the strongest variables involved were the presence of photographs 
and email addresses. With these in use, suspicious responses for both vulnerable and non-
vulnerable profiles were roughly equal, showing perhaps that these factors encouraged 
paedophiles to ignore caution and security in favour of gratification. Profiles without these 
variables had a more predictable outcome, with vulnerable profiles receiving more attention 
than non-vulnerable profiles. From these initial results, it is recommended that all underage 
users of social networking platforms be very cautious about placing photographs of 
themselves in their profiles and to avoid publication of email addresses. In general the 
education of both parents and children about the importance of privacy and the power of the 
databases underpinning much of the internet is essential (Barnes 2006) 
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In terms of security, Horizon was by far the best of the three tested and suggests that a 
community-based social networking platform seems to be the safest. This platform probably 
enabled self-policing to occur. Paradoxically, Horizon allows 14-year-old members to create 
completely public profiles. Both Adulescentia and Osirus appeared to have insufficient 
security in place to detect and suspend the accounts of underage members. Osirus’s 
completely non-public profiles, however, did provide a measure of security as compared to 
Adulescentia’s layered membership feature. 
 
In the end, the best security must come from within the user’s home and habits.  Underage 
users such as the one in Kurt Eichenwald’s investigation are at greater risk by having 
computers in their bedrooms and un-supervised, unlimited Internet access (O’Reilly 2005). 
The Australian Government’s concept of the distribution of free filtering software falls short 
of the ever-increasing knowledge of Internet technology which children possess and the 
increasing role of on-line friendships or ‘friending’ among teens that will undermine these 
forms of control (Boyd 2006). The alternative of an Internet Service Provider level filter has 
been dismissed as ineffective in blocking all pornography (a problem with the filtering 
software as well) and may also limit access to legitimate sites (for example health; see 
Minow 2004). The impact of the associated slower internet speeds (LeMay 2006) will also be 
resisted by e-commerce and it is unlikely the speed of Internet connections may be sacrificed 
for the safety of vulnerable users. Ultimately, the best form of Internet security is parental 
monitoring in the form of human supervision and the education of children about the dangers 
posed by the Internet and the importance of privacy self-protection (Barnes 2006). We may 
do better to empower children to police the Internet and to recognise their rapid absorption of 
the changes released by Web 2.0 and the relentless privatisation and commercialisation that is 
now increasingly apparent. 
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Appendix A: Web 2.0 and Social Networking 
 
The Internet is a vast and largely under moderated network of computers and servers 
stretching across most of the Earth, linked mainly via land-based telecommunications 
networks, though satellites are also used to transmit data from one location to another. This 
creates a relatively new ‘data-scape’ which can be used to contain and transmit almost any 
material conceivable – including physical goods via online market-places like EBay and 
Amazon – from one user to another almost instantaneously. Overcoming time and distance 
the Internet has created a new form of socialising and communication. The Internet thus 
forms a constantly evolving frontier, which law enforcement must constantly monitor in 
order to keep abreast. The phenomenon of child sexual grooming has evolved along with 
other cybercrime and has entered a phase loosely called Web 2.0. The term Web 2.0 denotes 
a progression in the use and capabilities of the Internet. In 2005 Tim O’Reilly and MediaLive 
International proposed the name for a conference on the future of the Internet (O’Reilly 
2005). While the conference and the definition of the Web 2.0 phenomenon was business 
oriented, the term has largely come to denote – with much ongoing debate and discussion – 
three main advances in which the Internet is used: 
 
1. Data Management and Integration 
 
Websites are no longer static information-holders, but dynamic and interactive platforms that 
are constantly updated by the user as well as the webmaster. An example of this would be the 
difference between the personal homepages offered by free hosting sites such as Geocities 
and Yahoo and the online journals (weblogs or blogs) offered by Livejournal. Both concepts 
have been integrated to provide interactive, feature-rich and deeply networked profile-pages 
from MySpace and MSN Spaces. These companies have created products that are services as 
opposed to artefacts, with an on-going developmental program that often involves the user in 
the actual conception. 
 
2. Users as Participants in Communities 
The end-user in the Web 2.0 is also a participant in a community of users who also provide 
the content for the product being used. The user’s role has changed from receiving a product 
to participating in the product itself. Thus the content of Youtube, which is a service that 
allows the upload of streaming videos for public consumption, is mostly provided by the 
consumer- user. One of the most interesting developments, and one of the best examples of 
this, is Wikipaedia, an online encyclopaedia that is written by users themselves, both 
professionals and laymen.   
 
3. Social Networking 
This incorporation of users as content and software developers has created communities 
reminiscent of the older message boards and Usenet discussion services, but on a vast and 
more complex scale. Youtube, Adulescentia, MSN Communities and Spaces, Wikipaedia, 
blogs: all of these services have created super-communities where people can connect to each 
other in a deeper way than ever before. Different services have been integrated into each to 
provide connected networks. An example of this would be the MySpace profile site, which 
offers the user a personal blog, an extensive friends list, a forum, space to upload pictures, 
music and videos and an instant messenger service. The search feature on MySpaceis 
powered by Google, which itself has integrated an email service, a mapping feature that can 
be integrated into websites and blogs to show certain locations down to street-number level, 
along with many other services (O’Reilly 2005: 2). 
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The result of such integration via social networking services reveals more information than a 
user would normally expect. MySpace, for example, actively encourages a user to advertise 
their online profile on other social networking services like Yahoo! and AOL Instant 
Messenger. Businesses, mainstream actors and musical artists have also started using 
MySpace as a way to communicate with their client and fan base. MySpace profiles have 
evolved from purely social networking between casual Internet users to a valid and 
acceptable online presence, comparable to official websites, business cards and company 
newsletters (Shipman 2007). It is not a stretch, then, to read a user’s MySpace profile, collect 
information from the blog available, examine the user’s friends list for those the user knows 
in real life and with the aid of Google Maps, triangulate the user’s general real-life location 
down to the neighbourhood level. With the aid of that profile information and blog, it is quite 
possible for an intelligent person or agency to build up an extensive psychological profile of 
the user: likes, dislikes, music, lifestyle and many other factors that are listed openly.  
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